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PROTECTING THE PLAYGROUND: OPTIONS
FOR CONFRONTING THE IRANIAN REGIME
Bryan P. Schwartz* & Christopher C. Donaldson**
INTRODUCTION

T

he situation facing the United States in its relations with the Iranian regime is reminiscent of schoolyard politics.1 Imagine you
are the biggest and toughest kid on the playground. All the other kids
respect you out of fear of your size and strength. Now imagine you learn
that your best friend is cornered by a bully across the yard near the
swings. The bully has threatened your friend with violence, and rumor
has it that the bully has been trying—perhaps successfully—to acquire or
construct powerful weapons to make good on that threat. There is a
chance the bully may wipe your best friend and many others clear off the
face of the playground. What do you do?
After years of hurling threats and physical abuse by proxy at Israel,
Iran is now coming closer than ever to obtaining nuclear weapons.2 Some
commentators believe the Iranians would use these weapons to get what
they want, via threat or actual attack.3 Time is running out for the United
States (and the rest of the kids on the playground) to take action to prevent a catastrophe.4

* LL.B. (Queen’s); LLM (Yale); J.S.D. (Yale). Dr. Bryan Schwartz has been a
professor of law at the University of Manitoba since 1981. He is the inaugural holder of
the Asper Chair of International Business and Trade Law, which was created in 1999. He
has authored eight books and over sixty academic articles on a wide range of topics that
include constitutional law, international business and trade law, administrative law, labour law, and aboriginal law. In addition, he is the founding and general editor of two
annual scholarly publications: The Asper Review of International Business and Trade
Law and Underneath the Golden Boy: A Review of Manitoba Statutes.
** B.A. (Wilfrid Laurier); LL.B. (Manitoba). Chris Donaldson is currently articling
at Aikins, MacAulay & Thorvaldson, LLP. He has been an editor of The Asper Review
of International Business and Trade Law as well as Franchise Law Reform: International
Perspectives on Creating a Manitoba Statute.
1. See discussion infra Part I.
2. THÉRÈSE DELPECH, IRAN AND THE BOMB: THE ABDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 10 (Ros Schwartz trans., Columbia University Press 2007) (2006).
3. See Middle East Media Res. Inst., Former Iranian President Rafsanjani on Using a
Nuclear Bomb Against Israel, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/582.htm.
4. For the comments of Israel’s President Shimon Peres, see generally Mark Lavie,
Israeli President Takes Swipe at Iran’s Nuclear Program, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30,
2008, http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2008/04/30/israeli_president_
takes_swipe_at_irans_nuclear_program/.
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An international body like the United Nations—or, an individual country like the United States—can choose to intervene5 diplomatically, economically, or militaristically,6 and can then choose from at least two different angles (positive or negative) from which to pursue any one of
these approaches. All in all, there are at least six distinct courses of action worth considering.
In Part I of this Article, for background, we briefly explore the origins
of the current global tensions Iran is fueling. In Part II, we discuss the
various options available to the U.S. and its allies in dealing with Iran.
Finally, in Part III, we offer suggestions as to which route is best given
the current environment, and we argue that the lessons of World War II
might beneficially inform the approach to Iran.
Ultimately, in laying out the available options, our primary hope is that
the confrontation can be resolved effectively and without cost to human
life. Also, we hope the forthcoming analysis may shed some light on
similar problems in the future.
I. THE ISSUES
The current Iranian regime is problematic for two main reasons. First,
they have actively supported terrorism both in the Middle East and in
other areas of the world.7 Second, they have continued to press on with
their nuclear program despite the United Nations’ resolutions expressing
international consensus that they must end it. 8 The current regime has
taken the role of a bully, using force (violent and otherwise) to get what
it wants regardless of the consequences for the rest of the world.9 It is
this egocentrism and lack of concern for larger global society that worries observers and has led to the calls for action.10
A. Terrorism
The current Iranian regime has a history of providing financial and
ideological support to violent organizations. In Lebanon, the regime has
funded Hezbollah since its inception.11 In Gaza, the regime provides
5. See discussion infra Part II.
6. See discussion infra Part II.
7. See discussion infra Part I.A.
8. See discussion infra Part I.B.
9. See discussion infra Part II.A–B.
10. For an example of a call to action, see S.C. Res.1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1835
(Sept. 27, 2008).
11. See Andrea Levin, Death and Destruction are Hezbollah’s Goals,THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 8, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/08/
08/death_and_destruction_are_hezbollahs_goals/.
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support to both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”).12 In supporting these groups, the Iranian regime has had a direct or indirect hand
in the deaths of thousands around the world.
In the early 1980s, Hezbollah was created by the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard—the regime’s militant wing under the control of the Iranian Supreme Leader.13 Iran reportedly injects $120 million into Hezbollah annually14 and allegedly also provides periodic shipments of missiles.15 The
fact that Iran has supported a group whose avowed goal is to destroy
Israel16 has raised eyebrows around the world.17 Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s
violence has reached other nations beyond Israel as well.18
In 1983, as one of its first organized acts, Hezbollah orchestrated a
truck bomb attack at the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241
people.19 Until September 11, 2001, Hezbollah had killed more Americans than any other terrorist group.20 In 1994, with Iranian funding, Hezbollah bombed the Jewish-Argentine Mutual Association building in Buenos Aires, Argentina, killing 85 and wounding 300 others.21 With Iran’s
help, Hezbollah has spread its particular brand of violence to several corners of the globe.
But Hezbollah is not the only terrorist group that benefits from Iranian
patronage. Hamas, before it became the ruling party of the Palestinian
Authority, was receiving funding from Iran as well.22 And this funding
increased when Hamas gained power.23 Iran also supplies rockets24 to

12. Dore Gold, Introduction, in JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS, IRAN,
HIZBULLAH, HAMAS AND THE GLOBAL JIHAD 7, 7 (2007).
13. Don Mills, Hezbollah’s Hate, Made in Iran, NAT’L POST, July 28, 2006, at A12.
14. Id.
15. Amos Harel & Yoav Stern, Iranian Official Admits Tehran Supplied Missiles to
Hezbollah, HAARETZ, Aug. 5, 2006, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml.
16. Levin, supra note 11.
17. Mills, supra note 13.
18. See discussion infra Part I.A.
19. Levin, supra note 11.
20. Id.
21. Iran Charged over Argentina Bomb, BBC NEWS, Oct. 25, 2006, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/ 6085768.stm [hereinafter Iran Charged].
22. See Council on Foreign Relations, Hamas: Backgrounder, http://www.cfr.org/
publication/8968/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
23. Hamas Secures More Iranian Funding, AL JAZEERA, Mar. 6, 2007, available at
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2A62C583-E1C7-454E-B0B3-16DB56E3C4FD.htm.
24. See Rory McCarthy, Hamas Rockets Bring Israeli City in Range, THE GUARDIAN,
Mar. 5, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/05/israelandthe
palestinians.
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Hamas, a group that believes, “In the face of the Jews’ usurpation of Palestine, it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised.”25
While Hamas does not have a history of violence as extensive as Hezbollah, Iran’s support for Hamas certainly raised substantial concern.26
Iran has also provided a bounty to the Gaza-based Palestinian Islamic
Jihad group for the rockets they fired into Israel.27
The link between all three of these terrorist organizations is their antiSemitism.28 It is no secret that the Iranian regime wants to see the Israeli
state removed from the Middle East.29 It is the regime’s avowed disdain
for Israel that also drives global concern over its nuclear program. Although the Iranian regime consistently insists that it is only pursuing nuclear energy for civilian use, it has failed to convince the world of its
peaceful intentions.30
B. Nuclear Dispute
Iran’s civilian nuclear program began with the help of the United
States in 1959, but the few installations that were in place by 1980 were
heavily bombed during the Iran-Iraq war.31 Iran’s American-funded civilian nuclear program had been decimated by the time the fighting ended
in 1988.32 After the war, the Iranian regime secretly began constructing a
new nuclear program.33 While it was suspected that Iran was trying to

25. THE COVENANT OF THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT art. 15, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.
26. See, for example, the comments of former U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow.
Press Release, U.S Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas
and Six Senior Hamas Leaders as Terrorist Entities (Aug. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js672.htm.
27. Uzi Mahnaimi, Tehran ‘Bounty’ for Attack on Israel, TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 30,
2005, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article584462.ece.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 22–27.
29. There are too many quotes about Israel being a “cancer” to cite.
30. See IAEA Report Raises Concerns about Iranian Nuclear Facilities, CNN,
Nov.16,
2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/11/16/iran.iaea.nuclear.facility/index.html.
31. FRANK BARNABY, WOULD AIR STRIKES WORK? sec. 1.1 (Oxford Research Group,
Briefing Paper) (2007), http://www. oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/would
airstrikeswork.pdf.
32. See Anti-Defamation League, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in His
Own Words, Sept. 18, 2009, http://www.adl.org/main_Anti_Semitism_International/
ahmadinejad_words.htm.
33. See ALIREZA JAFARZADEH, THE IRAN THREAT: PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD AND THE
COMING NUCLEAR CRISIS 158 (2007).
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acquire nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990s,34 their strides toward
developing their own devices were kept secret.35 With the aid of nations
such as Pakistan, China, and Russia, as well as the notorious blackmarket nuclear network of A.Q. Khan, Iran developed enough knowledge to master the process of uranium enrichment.36 By the turn of the
millennium, Iran had come a long way in developing a dual-use program.37 Iran was mastering the technology necessary for building nuclear
power generators, but with that ability came the knowledge needed to
make nuclear weapons.38
In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran—an Iranian political opposition group that many accuse of being a terrorist organization—
revealed these nuclear research activities to the world.39 The International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) demanded inspection of the alleged
nuclear research sites and discovered that Iran had been hiding significant amounts of undeclared nuclear materials.40 Since this revelation,
there has been widespread concern about the Iranian regime’s motivations.41
Attempting to assuage the concerns of the global community, the Iranian regime has denied that the program will have any military application.42 G. Ali Koshroo, Iran’s former Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal
and International Affairs, has said that the Iranian regime believes that
“the acqui[sition], development, and use of nuclear weapons [is] inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our basic principles. They have no
place in Iran’s defense doctrine.”43 Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah
34. For example, President Clinton’s Letter to Congress on March 14, 1997, highlighted that Executive Order 12957 was issued “in response to actions and policies of
the Government of Iran, including support for international terrorism, efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process, and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
and the means to deliver them.” Letter from William Clinton, President of the United
States, to U.S. Congress (Mar. 14, 1997), available at http://www.fas.org/news/iran/
1997/wh97031701.htm.
35. See JAFARZADEH, supra note 33, at 158.
36. IRAN WATCH, IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM (2004), http://www.iranwatch.org/wmd/
wponac-nuclearhistory-0904.htm.
37. See JAFARZADEH, supra note 33, at 158.
38. See id.
39. SHARON SQUASSONI, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IRAN’S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/nuke/RS21592.pdf.
40. Id. at 2.
41. This is evidenced by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, infra Part
II.C.
42. See infra text accompanying note 43.
43. BARNABY, supra note 31, at sec. 1.2.
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Khamenei, has also issued a religious decree saying that the production
and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam.44 Despite these
statements, however, doubts persist. These doubts are probably best captured by Abbas Maleki, former Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, who
said that Iran’s alleged need for peaceful nuclear power is “akin to raising cows in your house to provide you with your daily glass of milk.”45
The United States, Israel, and the U.N. Security Council obviously believe that the Iranian regime is raising its cows for a more sinister purpose.
One of the reasons for these doubts is the Iranian regime’s lack of credibility.46 In 2003, a complex web of lies regarding the conversion activities of Iranian scientists at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center was finally untangled. Confronted with its conflicting statements, the regime
was forced to admit that it had lied to the IAEA.47 It has also been revealed that the regime made false statements about their uranium metal
stocks,48 the P-2 Centrifuge program,49 the extent of the laser enrichment
program,50 and covert experiments involving reprocessed fuel.51 It is
quite understandable that, at this point, very little that the regime says
about its program can be taken at face value.
To make matters worse, the Iranians have been going to great lengths
to build hidden, underground facilities that are immune to conventional
aerial attacks. The facilities at Natanz, for example, are buried beneath
23 meters of concrete and earth.52 Satellite imagery shows tunneling near
some existing nuclear sites, leading some to believe that even more secret facilities are being built.53 Further, international inspectors have
identified nuclear activities on military-controlled sites to which they

44. Leader’s Fatwa Forbids Nukes, IRAN DAILY, Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.
irandaily.com/1384/2347/html/index.htm.
45. Sepehr Shahshahani, Note, Politics Under the Cover of Law: Can International
Law Help Resolve the Iran Nuclear Crisis?, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 369, 417 (2007).
46. See infra text accompanying note 47.
47. See JAFARZADEH, supra note 33, at 158.
48. See id. at 158–59.
49. See id. at 162.
50. See id. at 165–66.
51. See id. at 170.
52. Whitney Raas & Austin Long, Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to
Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities, INT’L SECURITY, Spring 2007, at 7, 17 (2007).
53. Philip Sherwell, Defiant Iran Insists There’s No Secret as Inspectors Invited to
Qom Nuclear Site, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Sep. 26, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/middleeast/iran/6235547/Defiant-Iran-insists-theres-no-secret-as-inspectorsinvited-to-Qom-nuclear-site.html.
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have been denied access for inspection.54 Given the amount of circumstantial evidence, the global community is finding it hard to believe that
Iran’s intentions are peaceful. Some in Israel and the U.S. think that the
Iranian regime is plotting a catastrophe.55 With its contempt for the Israeli state, its long-standing support for terrorism, and its undercover nuclear operations, such concerns certainly have an air of validity. Thus, the
international community must find a way to confront Iran effectively.
II. THE OPTIONS IN CONTEXT
A. Diplomacy
Diplomacy remains a viable tool for persuading the Iranian regime to
change its behavior. One positive diplomatic option is to entice the regime with an offer of regional power sharing in exchange for full engagement with the international community. A negative diplomatic option is to continue to try to delegitimize the Iranian regime. As will be
argued below, neither of these options is particularly attractive. Given the
history of Iran’s principled belligerence, other options must remain on
the table.
President Ahmadinejad has caused a stir by making remarks that have
been construed as denying the Holocaust.56 Most famously, President
Ahmadinejad commented in 2005 about Israel being “wiped off the
map.”57 For these remarks, he has received condemnation from the
U.N.,58 mock indictments for genocide,59 and a criminal indictment in
absentia in Germany for Holocaust denial.60 These are not the only con-

54. DELPECH, supra note 2, at 10.
55. See generally id.
56. See Anti-Defamation League, supra note 32.
57. While translations may vary, his remarks were, at least, something to that effect.
For possible alternative translations, see Ethan Bronner, Just How Far Did They Go,
Those Words Against Israel?, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at 4.4.
58. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Iran
(Oct. 28, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8542.doc.htm.
59. JUSTUS REID WEINER, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS, REFERRAL OF IRANIAN
PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD ON THE CHARGE OF INCITEMENT TO COMMIT GENOCIDE (2006),
available at http://www.jcpa.org/text/ahmadinejad-incitement.pdf; DAVID MATAS, INST.
FOR INT’L AFFAIRS OF B’NAI BRITH CANADA, INDICTMENT OF IRANIAN PRESIDENT
MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD FOR INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE AGAINST THE JEWISH PEOPLE 1
(2007), available at http://www.bnaibrith.ca/pdf/institute/IndictmentIranianPresident
March07.pdf.
60. Anthony David Marks, Israeli Lawyer Registers Criminal Indictment Against
Ahmadinejad in German Court, IHC NEWS, May 14, 2006, available at http://www.
infoisrael.net/images/articles/140520061.pdf.
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troversial statements that the President has made,61 nor is this the only
activity for which the Iranian regime has been the subject of criticism. In
1994, the Iranian regime funded an attack on the Jewish-Argentine Mutual Association building in Buenos Aires, which led the Argentinean
authorities to indict various Iranian political figures.62
The Iranian regime has consistently denied aiding the insurgencies in
Iraq and Afghanistan despite evidence that they are doing just that.63 The
regime has shown a desire to be a regional leader when the U.S. and its
coalition forces withdraw from the area.64 This is consistent with Iranian
philosophy regarding foreign relations; the traditional Islamic doctrine of
Dar al-Islam says that lands once subjugated by Muslims should remain
under Muslim control.65 The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan disrupts
this concept of the Islamic house.66 Of course, the Iranian regime would
like to see itself playing a large role in ridding these areas of Western
influence and bringing them back under Islamic control.67
The Iranian constitution implicitly enshrines the traditional philosophy
of Dar al-Islam by advocating the export of Islamic government
throughout the world.68 In furtherance of this goal, Iran has meddled in
the affairs of Palestine,69 Lebanon,70 Algeria,71 Sudan,72 Afghanistan,73
61. See Anti-Defamation League, supra note 32.
62. Iran Charged, supra note 21.
63. See Lionel Beehner, Council on Foreign Relations, Iran’s Involvement in Iraq,
http://www.cfr.org /publication/12521/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2010); Document: Iran
Caught Red-Handed Shipping Arms to Taliban, ABC NEWS, June 6, 2007, http://blogs.
abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/06/document_iran_c.html.
64. Interview by Fletcher Forum of World Affairs with Vali Nasr, Iran: The New
Claimant to Regional Power?, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer 2007, at 9, 17 (2007)
[hereinafter Interview with Vali Nasr].
65. BAT YE’OR, ISLAM AND DHIMMITUDE 59 (Miriam Kochan &David Littman trans.,
Associated Univ. Presses, 2002).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Beehner, supra note 63.
68. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri’i Isla’mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Iran] pmbl. [1980]; see also International Constitutional Law, Iranian Constitution,
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
69. See Ron Synovitz, Middle East: Palestinian Official Accuses Iran of Orchestrating Gaza Seizure, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, June 25, 2007,
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/06/e8d6e2ff-adbb-4d20-b9b3900f9b02afce.html.
70. See Middle East Media Res. Inst., Saudi Columnist in Scathing Criticism of Hizbullah and Syria: They are Trying to Destroy Lebanon Down to the Last Man, June 14,
2007, http://memri.org/ bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD162007.
71. Peter St. John, Commentary No. 65: Insurgency, Legitimacy & Intervention in
Algeria, COMMENT., Jan. 1996, available at http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/
cm65-eng.asp.
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Yemen,74 Iraq,75 and Somalia,76 among other nations.77 The Iranian regime has tried desperately to elevate itself to the level of a regional power by spending money to create and then solve problems in countries
based in traditional Muslim lands.78 The offer of a power-sharing structure in the region could perhaps prove an effective incentive for Iran to
conform its behavior.
B. Economic Sanctions
The negative economic incentive is, of course, economic sanctions.79
Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of the U.N., has called economic sanctions “a necessary middle ground between war and words.”80
At the same time, there is no shortage of detractors who feel that sanctions do not work.81 Meanwhile, sanctions can produce tremendously
negative humanitarian consequences not only for the citizens of the targeted state, but also for citizens of neighboring states. Even the state im-

72. Iran Accused of Promoting Shiitism in Sudan, SUDAN TRIB., Dec. 24, 2006,
http://www.sudantribune. com/spip.php?article19431.
73. See Muhammad Tahir, Iranian Involvement in Afghanistan, TERRORISM MONITOR,
Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/archivesgta/
gta2007/ (follow “Volume 5 Issue 1” hyperlink, then follow “Iranian Involvement in
Afghanistan” hyperlink).
74. Reuters, Yemen Accuses Iran of Backing Shi’ite Rebels, IRAN FOCUS, May 24,
2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/news desk/L24560705.htm.
75. Iran Spent over $1 Billion on Meddling in Iraq: Defence Minister, IRAN FOCUS
Jan. 17, 2005, http://www.iranfocus.com/en/iraq/iran-spent-over-1-billion-on-meddlingin-iraq-defence-minister-01258.html.
76. The Chairman of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, Report of the Monitoring
Group on Somalia, ¶¶ 87–94, delivered to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee, U.N. Doc. S/2006/913 (Oct. 16, 2006).
77. Yaakov Katz, 10 Israelis ‘Recruited as Spies By Iran, THE JERUSALEM POST, Apr.
17, 2007, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2Fshow
Full&cid=117615281494.
78. See Mark Tran, Ahmadinejad: Iran ready to fill Iraq power vacuum” Guardian
Unlimited, The GUARDIAN, Aug. 28, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/
aug/28/usa.iraq.
79. See Yochi J. Dreazen, Israel Lobbies Beijing for Iran Sanctions, WALL ST. J.
(ONLINE), Feb. 26, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703940
704575089731976340748.html.
80. Chantal de Jonge Ondraat, Economic Sanctions and International Peace and
Security, in LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR 335, 335 (Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall eds., 2007).
81. See generally Robert A. Page, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, INT’L
SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 90, 90 (1997); Robert A. Page, Why Economic Sanctions Still Do
Not Work, 23 INT’L SECURITY, Summer 1998, at 66, 66 (1998).
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posing sanctions can be negatively affected.82 At the very least, economic sanctions require careful implementation in order to avoid serious unintended effects.
Now consider the positive economic incentive: aid. This can take many
forms, such as direct funding from national governments or the International Monetary Fund.83 Economic Aid can also be geared toward enabling a state to engage in self-help in the future—one example would be
aiding Iran’s push to become a member of the World Trade Organization.84 By holding this carrot out for the regime, the world may be able to
influence its behavior without imposing the negative consequences of
sanctions.
Once upon a time, the U.S. had very cordial relations with Iran. These
soured with the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis at the
American Embassy in Tehran. In response to this turn of events,85 the
U.S. created the Iranian Assets Control Regulations.86 These regulations
instituted an asset freeze on the assets of the Iranian government in the
U.S. and were subsequently expanded to include a full trade embargo.87
Upon the signing of the Algiers Accords in 1981, the trade embargo was
lifted and most of the frozen assets were released.88 While these regulations still partially remain in place,89 they are of little practical effect for
the relations between the two countries today.
In 1987, a second set of sanctions came into force. President Ronald
Reagan issued an executive order prohibiting all imports of goods and
services from Iran into the U.S.90 He did so “[t]o ensure that United
States imports of Iranian goods and services will not contribute financial
support to terrorism or to further aggressive actions against nonbelligerent shipping.”91 Eventually, the Reagan Executive Order gave

82. See De Jonge Ondraat, supra note 80 at 335.
83. Mike Bagully, The Iranian Dilemma, 11 GEO. PUBLIC POL’Y REV. 111, 116
(2005).
84. Id.
85. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF O.F.A.C
REGULATIONS INVOLVING SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN 4 (2009), http://www.treas.gov/
offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/iran.pdf [hereinafter U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:
IRAN].
86. 31 C.F.R. § 535 (2009).
87. U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IRAN, supra note 85, at 4.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id.
90. Exec. Order No. 12613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41940 (Oct. 30, 1987).
91. Id.
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rise to the Iranian Transactions Regulations,92 which codified the U.S.
embargo on trade in goods and services and are still in effect today.93
The Iranian Transactions Regulations, however, go further than the Reagan Executive Order as they prohibit not only the importation of Iranian
goods and services, but also the exportation and re-exportation of U.S.
goods, technology, and services to Iran.94
In 1995, President Clinton’s Executive Orders 1295795 and 1295996
tightened the sanctions against Iran even further. This time, however, the
sanctions did not focus on flows of goods, services, and technology. Rather, these two executive orders prohibited flows of money from the U.S.
to Iran.97 In particular, they prohibited: new investments in Iranian property,98 the financing of imports of goods and services, the financing of
exports of goods, services, and technology,99 and the financing, supervising, and managing of the development of petroleum resources located in
Iran.100 All of these provisions were also later included in the Iranian
Transactions Regulations.101 Violations of the Iranian Transactions Regulations could be criminally punished with up to $1 million in fines and,
for natural persons, up to 20 years in jail.102
Suspecting that the restrictions on its own citizens were not enough,
the U.S. enacted the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (“ILSA”) a year later
in 1996.103 According to one American author, the act was “born out of
frustration that our allies and friends were unwilling to restrict investment into Iran’s petroleum sector as did the U.S. in 1995.”104 The purpose of the ILSA was, in effect, to bar access to American markets—
essentially, to create a secondary boycott—of non-U.S. companies that
92. 31 C.F.R. § 535 (1988).
93. In 2000, the Iranian Transactions Regulations were eased slightly. They were
amended to incorporate §560.534, which was added to allow Iranian carpets and certain
food products to be imported into the United States. 31 C.F.R. § 560 (1995).
94. 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.201, 560.204, 560.205 (1995).
95. Exec. Order No. 12957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14615 (Mar. 15, 1995) [hereinafter Clinton
Executive Order 12957].
96. Exec. Order No. 12959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24755 (May 6, 1995) [hereinafter Clinton
Executive Order 12959].
97. See infra text accompanying notes 99–98.
98. Clinton Executive Order 12957, supra note 95, at sec. 1(e).
99. Id. at sec. 1(a)–1(b).
100. Id.
101. Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§560.207–560.209.
102. U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IRAN, supra note 85, at 1.
103. Iran and Libya Scantions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–172, 110 Stat. 1541
(1996).
104. Arthur T. Downey, Extraterritorial Sanctions in the Canada/U.S. Context – A
U.S. Perspective, 24 CAN. – U.S. L.J. 215, 221 (1998).
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invest in Iranian petroleum development.105 While the ILSA sanctions
have yet to be imposed on a foreign company,106 the threat has induced
non-U.S. firms to join their American counterparts and avoid investments in Iran.
The economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States are
heavy. They include embargoes on goods, services, technology, and investment flows.107 On the other hand, the sanctions are unilateral.108 Although the U.S. has used the ILSA to try to influence companies in other
nations to comply with the sanctions, they have no jurisdiction aside
from denying access to American markets. The price of U.S. sanctions
may be steep for Iran, but in the end, the application of the sanctions is
quite narrow.
By 2006, the U.N. Security Council had seen several IAEA reports expressing concern over Iran’s nuclear program and the Iranian regime’s
lack of cooperation in providing information about it. In its Resolution
1696,109 the Security Council issued an ultimatum to the Iranian regime:
either cease nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities, and comply
with the IAEA’s transparency procedures or become the target of U.N.
sanctions.110 The resolution gave the Iranian regime one month to comply before sanctions would take effect.111 Needless to say, Iran refused.
On December 23, 2006, nearly four months after the deadline for compliance, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1737,112 marking
the first round of sanctions. Among other things, this resolution prohibited the supply, sale, or transfer of goods which could aid Iran’s nuclear
program;113 prohibited the financing of the acquisition of such goods;114
limited Iran’s ability to export goods related to its nuclear activities or
ballistic missiles;115 restricted the mobility of those named persons in-

105. Lynn R. Coleman & Thomas R. Graham, The Stars and Stripes Wherever: The
Impact of Unilateral U.S. Economic Sanctions on the International Petroleum Industry,
35 ALTA. L. REV. 334, 345 (1997).
106. DEAN A. DEROSA & GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, NORMALIZATION OF ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAN’S ECONOMY AND THE UNITED STATES (2008), available at http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/NFTC%20Iran%20Normalizaton%20Book.pdf.
107. See discussion infra Part I.C.
108. Coleman & Graham, supra note 105, at 345.
109. S.C. Res. 1696, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
110. Id. at ¶ 9.
111. Id. at ¶ 7.
112. See S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006).
113. Id. ¶ 3.
114. Id. ¶ 6.
115. Id. ¶ 7.
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volved with Iran’s nuclear program;116 and also froze the assets of these
persons and entities.117 These sanctions were subject to review after a
period of 60 days.118 In the event that Iran did not comply with the Security Council’s demands, the U.N. reserved the right to toughen the sanctions in a further resolution.119
When the Iranian regime failed to comply, the Security Council indeed
toughened the sanctions. In Resolution 1747,120 the Security Council
broadened the list of named persons and entities that were subject to the
mobility121 and asset-freezing122 sanctions. In addition, the Security
Council restricted Iran’s ability to sell and transfer arms,123 and called on
U.N. member nations to restrict grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans to the Government of Iran except for humanitarian or development purposes.124 These sanctions were also subject to review after 60
days.125 Again, Iran failed to comply.
The the third set of sanctions arrived with Resolution 1803.126 Once
more, the Security Council expanded the list of persons and entities subject to the mobility127 and asset-freezing128 provisions. Furthermore, the
Security Council called on “all states to exercise vigilance in entering
into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade
with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals and entities,”129 and to “exercise vigilance over
the activities in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran . . . .”130
This round of sanctions, however, was given an expanded 90-day period
before review.131
To date, Iran has yet to comply with the Security Council’s demands.
At the time of this writing, a fourth round of sanctions is being contem116. Id. ¶ 10.Exceptions are made for nationals of other countries and humanitarian
considerations. See id. at ¶ 11.
117. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 112, at ¶ 12. Exceptions are made for basic necessities, among other things. Id. at ¶¶ 13–15.
118. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 112, at ¶24.
119. Id. at ¶24(c).
120. See S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007).
121. Id. at ¶ 2.
122. Id. at ¶ 4.
123. Id. at ¶ 5.
124. Id. at ¶ 7.
125. Id. at ¶ 13.
126. See S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
127. Id. at ¶ 3.
128. Id. at ¶7.
129. Id. at ¶ 9.
130. Id. at ¶ 3.
131. Id. at ¶ 3.
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plated which would target the assets of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards.132 While the Security Council does not appear to be supportive
of a strong fourth round of sanctions,133 other international organizations—particularly the G8 group of nations—appear poised to push for
sanctions.134 Sanctions on the assets of the Revolutionary Guards will not
be as strong as those that were previously contemplated against the Iranian oil sector135 (an embargo on refined petroleum products would be
particularly painful for Iran, as 40% of the country’s domestic oil consumption is refined outside of the country);136 still, they are a step in the
right direction.
In contrast to sanctions imposed by the United States, those imposed
by the U.N. Security Council have very broad application. In theory, the
prescribed measures are adhered to by all of the U.N. member-states.
Meanwhile, the impact of U.S. sanctions is limited—the number of states
joining the U.S. is limited even though the U.S. is broader in scope.137 If
sanctions as serious as an embargo on petroleum exportation to Iran are
to have an immediate effect, they must be adopted by the Security Council rather than unilaterally by the U.S.138
C. The Military Option
Many have urged the exercise of military options before Iran develops
a nuclear weapon. A similar nuclear threat in 1981 resulted in the Israeli
Air Force flying into Iraq and bombing the Osiraq nuclear reactor.139 The
attack was quite successful in that it slowed down the Iraqi nuclear weapons program to the point where Iraq was no longer a nuclear threat to
132. Cambell Clark, As Frustrations Over Inaction Mount, PM Vows to Turn Screw on
Iran, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
politics/pm-backs-tougher-sanctions-on-iran/article1463356/.
133. Joseph Nasr, Netanyahu to lobby in Russia for Iran Sanctions, REUTERS, Feb 14,
2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61D0WA20100214.
134. Clark, supra note 132.
135. See Paul Reynolds, Iran: New Confrontation Looms, BBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8180999.stm; Merle David Kellerhals Jr., United States, Allies
Exploring Further Sanctions Against Iran, AMERICA.GOV, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.
america.gov/st/peacesecenglish/2010/January/20100112141741dmslahrellek0.6837122.html.
136. DELPECH, supra note 2, at 103.
137. See supra notes 113–115, 123 and accompanying text.
138. See Harry Wolff, Note, Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool or Ineffective Hindrance on American Business?, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 329,
358–59 (2006).
139. Peter Scott Ford, Israel’s Attack on Osiraq: A Model for Future Preventative
Strikes? 1 (Sept. 2004) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), available
at http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/ford.pdf.
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Israel’s existence.140 Could a similar preemptive attack be launched
against Iran? If yes, should it be launched? There are many difficulties in
planning a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. First, there is the sheer
number of potential targets. In 2007, it was estimated that a strike inside
Iran would present some 400 potential targets in order to have a relatively high certainty of success.141 Without hitting all of these targets, the
Iranian nuclear program would be able to continue unfettered in some
capacity until the destroyed facilities come back online.142
Among the 400 potential targets, roughly 75 would require some sort
of penetrating warhead.143 After witnessing Iraq’s experience with its
Osiraq reactor, Iran took pains to hide its facilities both in underground
installations and near heavily populated areas.144 The facility at Natanz,
for example, is covered by nearly 23 meters of concrete and earth.145 Additionally, there is no guarantee that all of the 400 targets are still functioning facilities. Any type of bombing exercise would likely destroy
facilities that are no longer affiliated with the nuclear program. In a heavily populated area, this is a serious concern. Further, even if all the facilities could be destroyed with minimal civilian casualties, the program
might continue nonetheless. As Mohamed El Baradei, the head of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, is fond of saying: “you cannot
bomb knowledge.”146 Facilities can easily be rebuilt. Equipment can be
repurchased and smuggled into the country through a variety of means
regardless of the ongoing sanctions. It is the knowledge of the nuclear
fuel cycle—knowledge that can survive any amount of bombing—that
will keep the Iranian nuclear program alive. At this point, it seems as if it
will only be a matter of time before Iran obtains the technological knowledge required to build a nuclear weapon.147
140. Id. at 2.
141. Sam Gardiner, Et Maintenant En Avant: Preemption and the Planning for Iran,
57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 443, 446 (2007)
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Bagully, supra note 843 at 115.
145. Raas & Long, supra note 52, at 17–18.
146. Interview by Daniel Dombey, Financial Times, with Mohamed ElBaradei, Head
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Feb. 19, 2007), available at http://www.
iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2007/ft190207.html.
147. If a preemptive strike is carried out, there is no doubt that the Iranian regime will
translate its technological knowledge into a nuclear arsenal at the first opportunity. Such
strikes also increase the likelihood that the regime will actually use those weapons, rather
than simply hold them as threats. A preemptive strike could escalate the diplomatic standoff beyond the point that any amount of diplomacy could control it. Such a situation is
not in anyone’s interest.
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There is another option—a military strike after the Iranian regime has
obtained the materials and knowledge required to build a nuclear bomb.
This, of course, would have to take a much different form. During the
Second World War, the British employed tripwires for the Germans and
Italians when they finally decided that appeasement was no longer possible. On March 31, 1939, the British announced that any aggression
against Polish independence would bring a military response from both
the United Kingdom and France.148 This was followed by both governments issuing similar guarantees for the independence of Greece and
Romania in April of 1939.149 Hitler was infuriated watching the British
engage in what he called “the policy of encirclement.”150 Despite the
guarantees, of course, Hitler went ahead with his plans to invade Poland
on September 1, 1939, and started World War II.
In speaking about the British guarantees against Hitler’s aggressive
plan, Lord Halifax said, “[I]t might still be possible to deter him from its
execution if, as we had failed to do in 1914, we made it unmistakably
clear that the particular acts of aggression which he was believed to have
in mind would result in a general war.”151 Obviously, Hitler was not deterred. On the other hand, his aggression was finally unmasked and eventually his reign of terror was brought to an end. The tripwires may have
encouraged the eruption of violence, but, in the end, they solved the underlying problem.
Tripwires may also be effective for the Iranian situation. Clearly, however, the hope is that they would prevent a war rather than start one. By
having guidelines with a clear set of serious consequences, rational leaders would seek to confine their activities to avoid the tripwires.152 If the
leaders of Iran choose to follow in the footsteps of Hitler and flagrantly
violate the tripwire provisions, perhaps war is the only way to prevent
them from committing atrocities against Israel. If the Iranian regime
turns out to be as aggressive as Hitler was, it is probably in the world’s
best interest to address the problem early on.
The positive side of military intervention is military aid, though it is
not necessarily worth considering in this situation. Military aid serves its
greatest purpose when the intervening party and the target regime share a
mutual interest in resolving an ongoing dispute between the target regime
148. See Telford Taylor, The Guarantee to Poland—and After, in BRITISH
APPEASEMENT AND THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR II 119, 122–23 (R.J.Q. Adams ed,
1994).
149. Id. at 129.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 124.
152. Interview with Vali Nasr, supra note 64, at 13–15.
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and a third party.153 The Iranian regime’s only dispute in this case is with
Israel.154 Providing the Iranian regime with weapons in exchange for
dropping their aggressive stance toward the Israelis is simply illogical. If
military intervention is to take place, it can only be in the negative form
in this situation.
II. SUGGESTIONS
A. Diplomacy
What was left of the Iranian regime’s credibility has vanished after the
controversial 2009 Iranian Presidential election. The recent election fiasco155 appears to have eroded a large portion of the regime’s power
base.156 The Iranian youth has become very disenchanted with Iran’s political system.157 The recurrent demonstrations and clashes between the
opposition and the regime’s security forces throughout Iran are growing
increasingly violent.158 Losing legitimacy and facing shrinking domestic
support, the regime has been relegated to violence to suppress the opposition. It is said that domestic politics determine foreign policy.159 Iran’s
domestic “insurrection” should give pause to the U.S. as a lead negotiator. The U.S. simply does not know whether the regime will still be in
power or be replaced. The regime itself is constrained in negotiations
because of the domestic situation. Also, if the regime has its hands full
dealing with the domestic situation, it is unlikely to launch aggression
against anyone.

153. Examples include the military aid given to Afghanistan by the United States in
the early 1980s to support that regime’s fight against the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R., of
course, was the United States’ main competition for global political dominance at the
time. See Eric S. O’Malley, Destabilization Policy: Lessons from Reagan on International Law, Revolutions and Dealing with Pariah Nations, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 319, 352–55
(2003) (discussing the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan as part of a campaign
to erode the authority and influence of the U.S.S.R.).
154. See generally Benjamin M. Greenblum, The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Israel’s
Options Under International Law, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 55 (2006).
155. See Iran Loser Blasts ‘Illegal’ Poll, BBC NEWS, June 25, 2005, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4622955.stm.
156. See Iran Rises Up, THE ECONOMIST, June 20, 2009, at 11.
157. Sanam Vakil, War with Iran: Avoidable or Inevitable?, 20 FLA. J. INT’L L. 15, 16
(2008).
158. See The Beginning of the End?: Iran in Turmoil, THE ECONOMIST, Jan.1, 2010, at 8.
159. Raymond Hinnebusch, Introduction: The Analytical Framework, in THE FOREIGN
POLICIES OF MIDDLE EAST STATES 2 (Raymond Hinnebusch & Anoushiravan Ehteshami
eds., Lynne Reinner Publishers 2002).
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On the other hand, the regime has a habit of blaming others for its own
problems. The protesters’ deaths following the election demonstrations
were blamed on Britain and other Western countries.160 It is not outside
the realm of possibility that the regime would use Israel as a distraction
or scapegoat for its own internal problems. That being said, the regime
seems to be aware of the potential ramifications of a preemptive attack.161 It would be sheer insanity to attempt any sort of violence without
solidified domestic unity. Domestic turmoil and shattered credibility
have left the regime politically weak and vulnerable. This situation continues to provide uncertainty with respect to plans for diplomatic engagement.
From the positive standpoint, regional power sharing also does not
make much sense at the present. Given the domestic troubles currently
facing the regime, Iran is in no position to assuage the civil unrest in Iraq
and Afghanistan. If the regime is offered diplomatic engagement, there is
no telling what lengths it may go to in order to quell the rebellious voices
in the country. Further, the democratic governments of the West will not
want to be seen holding hands with an unstable regime, particularly an
authoritarian one.162 Given the current political environment in Iran, it is
best to refrain from any sort of diplomatic measures altogether.
B. It’s the Economy, Afterall
The environment is optimal, however, for further economic measures—both positive and negative. With the current political unrest, the
Iranian regime may be desperate to complete its nuclear quest and reestablish its legitimacy. If this is the case, it will sink as much money as is
feasible into the program to finish it as quickly as possible. If sanctions
are stepped up now, they will reduce the amount of money available for
the nuclear program. If the government makes cuts to social programs,
hospitals, and schools in order to redirect money toward nuclear science,

160. See Iran Blames Foreign Countries for Protester Deaths, USA TODAY, July 31,
2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-07-31-iran-protester-deaths_N.htm.
161. This is evident from its discussions of its ability to attack Israel in retaliation, but
not preemptively. See Nazila Fathi, General Says Iran Can Strike Back at Israel, THE
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20 2007, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/20/
world/middleeast/20iran.html.
162. See, e.g., Hubertus Hoffman, Obama’s new Foreign Policy needs a Double Strategy of Power and Diplomacy, INTERNATIONAL ANALYST NETWORK, Nov. 23, 2008,
http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=2583 (“There are still many unstable
authoritarian regimes and terrorists out there that must be contained with power, not paper. Washington must strengthen the understaffed U.S. Army and invest in new equipment and security.”).

2010]

OPTIONS FOR CONFRONTING IRAN

413

the political unrest in the country will likely boil over. Stepping up sanctions now has the prospect of suffocating Iran’s nuclear program.
The population in Iran is young and growing increasingly desperate.163
If sanctions are upgraded and the regime does nothing to offset them, the
ensuing unemployment and inflation will further antagonize the population. There will be a breaking point when the Iranian population will
refuse to endure the country’s persisting economic problems. Such a
breaking point was reached in 1979 when the Iranian people could no
longer put up with the Shah’s economic mismanagement.164 The Iranians
are a proud people, and, if the situation gets much worse, they will rise to
the occasion. A strengthening of the sanctions in place could, at least
theoretically, give them the final push that they need to overthrow the
regime and install the democracy that the people have wanted for so
long.165 Sanctions and selective military force proved effective in Libya
because of the country’s domestic pressure at the time.166
Positive economic measures might also have a drastic impact in the
current environment. The regime is facing a great deal of adversity and is
searching for some form of accomplishment to latch onto in order to recapture some of its legitimacy.167 If the global powers were to offer the
regime increased trade or a place in the World Trade Organization, for
example, in exchange for an end to their nuclear activities, the regime is
unlikely to forgo an opportunity to increase its legitimacy and improve
its economic plight. Of course, we must also keep in mind that the regime has been duplicitous in similar situations.168 If such an agreement
were to be reached, there would have to be some serious—possibly military—consequences should the regime renege on the agreement and take
the carrot while continuing its nuclear activities. In the event such an
agreement does occur, the Iranian regime should be tied down with tripwires to the greatest extent possible.
C. The Military Option
In the current environment, if an assault is to take place on Iran before
it builds a nuclear weapon, the assault must either be in response to an

163. See Vakil, supra note 157, at 16.
164. Jamie Lang, Note, International Sanctions: The Pressure on Iran to Abandon
Nuclear Proliferation, 6 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 141,148 (2007).
165. But see Interview with Vali Nasr, supra note 64, at 7–8.
166. YEHUDIT RONEN, QADDAFI’S LIBYA IN WORLD POLITICS 42, 48 (2008).
167. Vakil, supra note 157, at 19.
168. See JAFARZADEH, supra note 33, at 158–70.
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attack by Iran or be in accordance with a Security Council agreement.169
A Security Council agreement is highly unlikely, given the stances of
Russia and China on the issue.170 If Israel, or the U.S., finds a pretext that
is short of full blown aggression by Iran, international support would not
be behind such a retributive attack.171 Thus, a preemptive attack on Iran
is not, at this moment, militarily, politically, or legally feasible. Putting
tripwires in place, however, remains an attractive option.172 But, with
regard to the Iranian situation, what should the tripwires be? In keeping
with the historical precedent, an attack or attempted attack on another
country using nuclear material should be the first red line. Traditional
attacks on other countries by Iran can be dealt with in the traditional fashion—treating the act as a causus belli and engaging in war. Relations
between states have worked under this rule for countless years and there
is no reason to change now.173
Iran usually does not engage in conventional warfare. They use proxies, such as Hezbollah or Hamas, to carry out aggression for them. The
individual target countries of such attacks have done enough to deter
them so far and have allies they can call on should the attacks get any
worse. If Iran were to cross the threshold and ship nuclear material to
these groups174—whether the materials are used or not—a tripwire
should be activated and the international community should step in.
While a dirty bomb may not be as destructive as a conventional terrorist
attack, the psychological and economic effects on the target country
would be devastating.175 Not only that, but dirty bomb attacks are unner169. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Preserving the Peace: The Continuing Ban on War Between States, 38 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 41, 41 (2007).
170. Russia and China are generally opposed to sanctions. See Helene Cooper & William J. Broad, Russia and China Endorse Agency’s Rebuke of Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/world/28nuke.html.
171. For example, Israel may argue that Iran’s ongoing support of terror attacks
against Israel constitutes a causus belli, and the U.S. could point to Iran’s naval activities
in the Strait of Hormuz. See Barbara Starr, Iranian Boats ‘Harass’ U.S. Navy, Officials
Say, CNN, Jan. 7 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/01/07/
iran.us.navy/index.html.
172. Similar suggestions have been made by other scholars. See Interview by Fletcher
Forum of World Affairs with Martin Indyk, This New Struggle for Power: Assessing
American Foreign Policy in the Middle East, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter 2007, at
51, 57.
173. See generally James Thuo Gathii, Assessing Claims of a New Doctrine of PreEmptive War Under the Doctrine of Sources, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 67, 67 (2005).
174. For a discussion of Iran arming terrorists with “dirty bombs,” see Greenblum,
supra note 154, at 81.
175. Chairman of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, Report of
the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our
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vingly simple to carry out.176 Therefore, the possession or use of dirty
bombs should not be tolerated. The nuclear material is likely to be fingerprinted and traced back to Iran.177 If such material is used or is found
in the possession of one of Iran’s proxies, the international community
should step in to forcibly change the regime.
Evidence that Iran is enriching uranium beyond the needs of a civilian
electricity generation program should be a second tripwire. To be used in
a civilian electricity generation program, uranium need only be enriched
to a level of 2% to 6%.178 To be used in a nuclear weapon, uranium is
enriched to over 90%.179 This discrepancy leaves plenty of room for a
line to be drawn as to an acceptable level of enrichment. If it were discovered that the Iranians were enriching uranium past a certain point—
say, 20%, for example—that could be deemed a clear sign that there are
military intentions for the program. Once such evidence is established,
the international community should step in and put an end to Iran’s uranium enrichment. Unfortunately, given the regime’s secrecy regarding its
program, such evidence will likely be difficult to discover.180
As a final tripwire, Iran should not be allowed to manufacture, develop, purchase, or possess any nuclear-capable warheads. Accumulation of
such weapons shows a lack of good faith on behalf of the Iranian regime.
Even if the regime’s enrichment remains at the civilian level, the accumulation of warheads is a clear sign of a military intent. With the civilian
technology already in place, it would only be a matter of months before
weapons-grade uranium could be manufactured. If the warhead delivery
mechanism is kept out of the Iranian regime’s hands, the civilian program presents less of a threat.
The point of the tripwires is to strike a compromise between the two
positions. The Iranians say they only want peaceful electricity generation, but the U.N. Security Council is concerned that they want nuclear
weapons.181 The aim of the tripwires is to allow for a peaceful legitimate
civilian energy program while providing guarantees that the military poShared Responsibility, ¶ 113, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565
(Dec. 2, 2004).
176. James C. Kraska, Averting Nuclear Terrorism: Building a Global Regime of Cooperative Threat Reduction, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 703, 725 (2005).
177. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Comment, Targeting Tehran: Assessing the Lawfulness of
Preemptive Strikes Against Nuclear Facilities, 11 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 59,
69 (2006).
178. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 163 (2007).
179. Id. at 162.
180. See DELPECH, supra note 2, at 13–15.
181. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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tential of the program will not be realized. If the Iranian regime restricts
its activities to accord with its claimed intentions, the conflict will dissipate and a war, which seems almost inevitable to some,182 will surely be
avoided.
Ideally, these tripwires would be put in place by the U.N. Security
Council as a supplement to economic measures. If the Iranian regime
violates the terms of the tripwires, all of the nations within the international community will be free to respond in accordance with the previously agreed-upon consequences. There is the possibility, however,
that either Russia or China will prevent such tripwires from being
enacted.183 Political squabbling could remove the U.N. Security Council’s role as an option, but the U.N. should not be the only means of
putting the tripwires in place. As an alternative, these tripwires could be
enacted unilaterally by the United States and Israel. The message to the
Iranian regime may not be as forceful as it would be if coming from the
Security Council, but the measures could still be successful nonetheless.
The key will be the enacting nation’s or organization’s ability to follow
through with the outlined consequences.
CONCLUSION
In sum, there are three ways to approach the current problem with the
Iranian regime: diplomatically, economically, or militarily. To date, the
international community has taken diplomatic and economic positions
and has only threatened military action. Given the current political environment in Iran, it is time to step up the economic approach and put military tripwire measures in place in the event that the economic steps prove
ineffective. It is also time to consider providing the regime with some
economic carrots to coax them out of their aggressive stance. Such incentives could provide the regime with a path that allows them to save face
while acceding to global demands to halt their nuclear program. If something as mutually beneficial as increased trade can be given to the regime
in exchange for more acceptable behavior, the option should certainly be
canvassed.
On the other hand, there is always the threat that the regime will backtrack. Furthermore, other regimes may see this compromise as a green
light to act like rogue states for a few years and hold global security hostage in exchange for economic benefits. To address both situations, any
benefits package should be accompanied by as many restrictions and
182. See, e.g., Vakil, supra note 157.
183. Both nations have obstructed the passage of the three previous rounds of sanctions.
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tripwires as possible. The regime needs to know that it cannot renege on
its commitments, and other regimes need to see that the regime has not
been completely enriched by its deviance from international norms.
As a broader point, this situation should act as a testing ground for methods of dealing with state funders of terrorism in the post-9/11 world.
Whatever approach is taken by the United Nations, the United States,
and the global community at large, it should be analyzed for its possible
effectiveness in other situations. Of course, no two threats are the same.
Nor is it viable to devise a “one-size-fits-all” approach in an international
arena that is so diverse. General principles, however, should be transferable among such situations. The foreign policy toolbox contains numerous tools that should be deployed judiciously, each at the right time in
light of the specific context. However, one thing is certain: Iran is not the
only country that acts aggressively on the global playground. Also, Israel
is not the only victim. The rest of the kids on the playground must band
together to find a solution that will keep the aggressors at bay in the interest of peace, order, and mutual wellbeing.

